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COMMENTS
THE CONTINUING SAGA OF PREPAID FEED EXPENSE:
THE FAT LADY HAS NOT SUNG*
JAMES D. WRIGHT AND NANCY E. WRIGHT
I. INTRODUCTION
How can a farmer's accounting treatment of a simple item of
expense, prepaid feed, cause so much confusion and conflict among
the courts, the Internal Revenue Service (the Service), and the tax-
payers? This problem has been the subject of numerous articles'
and several revenue rulings,' yet, as recent cases illustrate, the con-
flict remains unresolved.3
The disagreement stems from a seemingly inconsequential treas-
ury regulation which has been in existence for twenty-two years.
Under Treasury Regulation section 1.471-6(a), a farmer is given
the option of using the cash receipts and disbursements method of
accounting instead of an inventory system. Farmers were singled
out for this preferential treatment primarily because the nature of
their business makes a simplified method of accounting more prac-
tical.5 This unique benefit granted farmers did not go unnoticed,
* Properly stated: "The opera's not over until the fat lady sings." This phrase was made
popular by Dick Motta, coach of the Washington Bullets professional basketball team, while
his team was playing the 1978 National Basketball Association championship series. As used
by Coach Motta, the phrase indicated that the series was not over until the final buzzer
sounded. As used here, the phrase is meant to imply that a legal conflict among courts is
never finally resolved until the Supreme Court or Congress decides the issue. No disrespect
of the Supreme Court or Congress is intended.
1. See generally Branscomb, The Cash Method as Applied in Agriculture-A Reexami-
nation, 25 TAX LAW. 125 (1971); Hjorth, Cattle, Congress and the Code-The Dangers of
Tax Incentives, 1968 Wis. L, REV. 641, 665-66; Klien, Treasury's Prepaid Feed Ruling:
Tough New Tests and Retroactivity Raise Questions, 40 J. TAX. 96 (1974); Pinney & Olsen,
Farmer's Prepaid Feed Expenses, 25 TAX LAW. 537 (1972); Ward, Tax Postponement and
the Cash Method Farmer: An Analysis of Revenue Ruling 75-152, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1119
(1975); Willingham & Kasmir, Prepaid Feed Deduction: How to Cope with IRS' Restrictive
New Ruling, 43 J. TAX. 230 (1975).
2. Rev. Rul. 79-229, 1979-31 I.R.B. 6; Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144.
3. See, e.g., Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422, 78-2 USTC 1 9566 (Ct. Cl. 1978);
Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233, 78-1 USTC 1 9144 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'g and rev'g 64
T.C. 1 (1975); Haynes v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 950 (1979); Heinold v. Commis-
sioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 685 (1979); Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083 (1979); De
La Cruz v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24 (1978).
4. (1980). The regulation provides: "A farmer may make his return upon an inventory
method instead of the cash receipts and disbursements method. It is optional with the tax-
payer which of these methods of accounting is used .... "
5. See, e.g., United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 116 (1966); Heinold v. Commissioner,
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however, as taxpayers became increasingly aware of the possible
tax benefits of such a regulation, apart from the business benefits.
Assisted by the Department of the Treasury's (the Treasury) lib-
eral definition of "farmer,"6 a tax shelter scheme was developed
around a limited partnership organized near the end of the year to
do business as a cattle feeding operation.7 In November or Decem-
ber the partnership "farmer" would purchase large amounts of
grain, sufficient to feed its cattle well into the next year. Using the
cash method of accounting, the partnership would deduct the full
amount of feed expense on its return, and since no cattle could be
sold in the partnership's short tax year there would be no offset-
ting income. The resulting net loss would be divided among the
limited partners, sheltering their other income.'
No doubt feeling insulted that their regulation was being used
against them, the Service sought to require deduction of feed ex-
pense when the feed was consumed rather than in the year of pay-
ment. Their first argument in support of this position was that the
taxpayer had only placed a deposit for the delivery of feed in the
future; the final payment was uncertain so it could not be currently
deducted.9 This argument (still in the Service's arsenal) was of lim-
ited usefulness, however, since a binding contract with a
nonrefundability clause could easily be arranged between wary
taxpayers.10
A more serious attack on the cash method for farmers' prepay-
ment and deduction of feed expense came in the form of Revenue
Ruling 75-152.1' In that 1975 ruling, the Service loaded a triple-
39 T.C.M. (CCH) 685 (1979). See also Hawkinson, Farm Expenses and General Accounting
Principles, 22 TAx L. REv. 237, 224-46 (1967); Ward, supra note 1, at 1148-51.
6. "All individuals, partnerships, or corporations that cultivate, operate, or manage
farms for gain or profit, either as owners or tenants, are designated as farmers." Treas. Reg.
1.61-4(d) (1980).
7. Investment in cattle feeding partnerships increased at a rapid rate during the early
1970's. Haynes v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 950, 952 (1979). According to one news
periodical, these partnerships were attracting almost $100 million a year of new money. See
Ward, supra note 1, at 1121 (citing NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1974, at 64).
8. I.R.C. § 702(a).
9. See Shippy v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D. 1961), aff'd, 308 F.2d 743, 62-2
USTC 9780 (8th Cir. 1962); Lillie v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 54 (1965), aff'd per curiam,
370 F.2d 562, 67-1 USTC V 9146 (9th Cir. 1966); Ernst v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 181 (1959).
For a thorough discussion of the payment versus deposit test, see Ward, supra note 1, at
1123-45.
10. See, e.g., Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673, 73-2 USTC V 9618 (8th Cir. 1973);
Gaddis v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 741, 71-2 USTC 9527 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Estate of
Cohen, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1970).
11. 1975-1 C.B. 144.
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barrel shotgun to be used against the prepayment scheme. Under
the ruling, prepaid feed expenses could not be deducted in the year
of payment unless three conditions were met:
First, the expenditure must be a payment for the purchase of feed
rather than a deposit; second, the prepayment must be made for
a business purpose and not merely for tax avoidance; and third,
the deduction of such costs in the taxable year of prepayment
must not result in a material distortion of income."
This provided the Service with two additional weapons: the re-
quirements that the timing of the payment have a business pur-
pose and that the deduction not result in a material distortion of
income.
Watching the increasing popularity of cattle feeding tax shel-
ters,1" Congress did not remain silent. The 1976 Tax Reform Act
added two new sections to the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)
which effectively eliminated a farmer's option to use the cash
method for most farming corporations and limited partnerships. 14
With these new pieces of legislation Congress pulled the rug out
from under the cattle feed tax shelter schemes. Unfortunately, the
Service's concurrent attacks upon these tax shelters resulted in
court decisions and revenue rulings which failed to differentiate
between "tax shelter" farming operations and legitimate farmers.
Thus, this indiscriminating adjudication means the issues sur-
rounding Treasury Regulation section 1.471-6(a) are alive and well
with respect to individual farmers and farming operations not
within the reach of the 1976 legislation. With respect to these
farmers, the right to immediate deduction of prepaid feed expenses
under the cash method of accounting depends upon recent court
decisions rather than Congress. This comment focuses on the re-
cent cases in the area which deal primarily with the business pur-
pose and distortion of income tests.
12. Id. In 1973, the Service announced Rev. Rul. 73-530, [1973] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 6951 (discussed in Ward, supra note 1, at 1122), to address the prepaid expense
issue. This ruling was temporarily enjoined by an Oklahoma district court which held the
ruling to be an unconstitutional invasion of legislative authority. On appeal, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed. Cattle Feeders Tax Comm. v. Shultz, 504 F.2d 462, 74-2 USTC 9732, rev'g
74-1 USTC V 9121 (D. Okla. 1973). The ruling was finally issued as Rev. Rul. 75-152.
13. See note 7 supra.
14. I.R.C. §§ 447, 464. See discussion in Part II of text infra.
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II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION
A general understanding of the Code definitions of accounting
methods and the various limitations on their uses is essential when
considering the prepayment problem. One of the taxpayers' princi-
pal arguments turns upon interpretation of "inventorying," while
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's (the Commissioner) defi-
nition of "clear reflection of income" serves as a primary weapon
against deduction of the prepayment. Both of these terms imply
arguments, as well as several parallel assertions, grounded in Code
sections listing the circumstances under which a particular type of
accounting treatment may be used.
A. General Rules
1. Method of Accounting: I.R.C. § 446
The starting point for any discussion of the Code's treatment of
accounting methods must be section 446.15 Under section 446(a), a
taxpayer may, subject to limitations not presently discussed, com-
pute taxable income based upon the method of accounting which
the taxpayer regularly uses to keep personal or business books.
The general rule under section 446(a) is self-explanatory except for
the term "method of accounting." A literal interpretation of the
phrase might indicate that the Code is referring only to the general
accounting treatment of all items of income and expense. The reg-
ulations under section 446, however, state that "method of ac-
counting" includes both the overall method and the accounting
treatment of any item.16 As will be explained later, this regulation
15. I.R.C. § 446 provides, in part:
(a) General Rule.-Taxable income shall be computed under the method of
accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in
keeping his books.
(b) Exceptions.-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the
taxpayer, or if the method does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secre-
tary, does clearly reflect income.
(c) Permissible Methods.-Subject to the provision of subsections (a) and
(b), a taxpayer may compute taxable income under any of the following methods
of accounting-
(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method;
(2) an accrual method;
(3) any other method permitted by this chapter; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under the regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(1) (1980).
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plays a role in the Service's argument that prepaid feed expense
should be deducted only when feed is consumed.
Section 446(c) lists permissible methods of accounting, including
the cash receipts and disbursements method, the accrual method,
any other method permitted by chapter 1 of the Code, or any ap-
proved combination of the previously listed methods.1 7 The cash
method of accounting provides for deduction of expenditures in
the year paid and inclusion of income in the year received."8 The
accrual method, on the other hand, has a slightly more complex
formula for the year of inclusion or deduction: an expense is de-
ducted when "all events have occurred which establish the fact of
the liability giving rise to such deduction"; " income is included
when "all events have occurred which fix the right to receive such
income.' ' 2° For both items of income and expense, the accrual
method requires an additional condition, that the amount of the
item be ascertainable "with reasonable accuracy.' '2
2. Year of Deduction: I.R.C. § 461
Section 461 coincides very nicely with section 446(a) by provid-
ing that any allowable deduction or credit is to be taken in the
taxable year which is proper under the method of accounting
used.2 2 Therefore, under the cash method expenditures are gener-
ally deductible in the taxable year paid, while under the accrual
method taxpayers normally deduct expenses in the taxable year
when the liability is certain and the amount is ascertainable.
B. Limitations
Treasury Regulation section 1.461-1(a)(1) includes a caveat ap-
17. Methods permitted under chapter 1 of the Code include the crop method of account-
ing, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-4, 1.62-12 (1980); the installment method, I.R.C. § 453; long-term
contract methods, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1980); special treatment of research and conserva-
tion expenditures, I.R.C. §§ 174-75, respectively.
The regulations recognize that uniformity among taxpayers is not advisable because of
circumstances unique to an individual or business; "Each taxpayer shall adopt such forms
and systems as are, in his judgment, best suited to his needs." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2)
(1980).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-(c)(i) (1980). For a good discussion of all basic accounting meth-
ods see Diamond & Holman, 46-4th T.M., Accounting Methods-Definitions, Permissibil-
ity. A detailed discussion of the cash and accrual methods is provided by Bebee & Mis-
iewicz, 407 T.M., Cash and Accrual Methods of Accounting.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (1980).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. I.R.C. § 461(a).
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plicable to both the cash and accrual methods: "If an expenditure
results in the creation of an asset having a useful life which ex-
tends substantially beyond the close of the taxable year, such an
expenditure may not be deductible, or may be deductible only in
part, for the taxable year in which made."23 The only specific ex-
ample mentioned in the regulations of a situation where this ca-
veat would apply is an expenditure for capital improvements on
leased property by the lessee, provided the useful life of the im-
provements exceeds the period left on the lease.2' The regulation
then refers the reader to section 263 of the Code, which requires
that certain expenditures relating to real property be capitalized
rather than currently deducted.2
Despite the differences between feed expenses and expenditures
for improvements of leaseholds or real property, the Service has
successfully argued that prepayment of feed creates an asset with a
useful life extending beyond the close of the taxable year.2
Section 446(b) is the principal limitation on the method of ac-
counting available to a taxpayer. That section provides, "If no
method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or
if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computa-
tion of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income. Thus, the
Commissioner is given considerable discretion to require a tax-
payer to change his or her method of accounting when, in his opin-
ion, the taxpayer's method does not "clearly reflect income." When
the Commissioner has determined a deficiency on this basis, the
taxpayer must bear the burden of proving that the challenged ac-
counting method clearly reflects income and this burden is by no
means light.2 8
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1980). This regulation is included in the Treasury's dis-
cussion of proper timing of deductions under the cash method. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.461-
l(a)(2) (1980) where identical language is used in reference to the accrual method. In addi-
tion, Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(ii) (1980) states: "Expenditures made during the year shall
be properly classified as between capital and expense. For example, expenditures for such
items as plant and equipment, which have a useful life extending substantially beyond the
taxable year, shall be charged to a capital account and not to an expense account."
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1980).
25. For example, I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) provides: "No deduction shall be allowed for-(1)
Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property or estate."
26. See, e.g., Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422, 78-2 USTC 9566 (Ct. Cl. 1978);
Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1114 (1979) (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
27. I.R.C. § 446(b).
28. Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422, 430, 78-2 USTC 9566 at 84,778 (Ct. Cl.
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As might be expected, neither the Code nor the regulations give
much assistance in construing what is meant by "clearly reflecting
income." Treasury Regulation section 1.446-1(a)(2), however, does
offer some guidance. It provides that consistent, year-to-year ac-
counting in compliance with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples in a particular trade or business, and in accordance with ac-
cepted conditions or practices of the trade or business, will
ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting income. The regulations
do not hint at the extraordinary circumstances that might trigger
the application of section 446(b).
Because "method of accounting" includes the accounting treat-
ment of any item, and because of the regulation's presumptions in
favor of the Commissioner, the Service's primary argument against
prepaid feed expense is made under section 446(b). According to
the Service, the deduction of prepaid feed expense in the year of
payment does not clearly reflect income (or, as stated by Revenue
Ruling 75-152, the deduction results in a "material distortion of
income"). To correct the distortion, the Service seeks to require
that the farmer-taxpayer deduct the feed expense when the feed is
consumed.
Although inventorying is not specifically described as a "method
of accounting" under section 446(c), section 471 gives the Commis-
sioner the authority to require a taxpayer to use inventories when
necessary "in order clearly to determine the income."2 9 Thus, the
ambiguous "clear reflection of income" test found in section 446(b)
has also been incorporated into section 471. The ambiguity is
somewhat clarified by section 471, because of the detailed exam-
ples given in the regulations.30 The most significant instance where
inventories are required is a business in which "the production,
purchase or sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor."3 1
Where the sale of a product is involved, the use of inventories will
result in a more perfect matching of income and expenses. Both
the matching phenomenon and the inventory process are illus-
trated by the following example.
1978); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 284 (1967).
29. I.R.C. § 471 states:
Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary the use of inventories is necessary in
order clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer, inventories shall be taken
by such taxpayer on such basis as the Secretary may prescribe as conforming as
nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the trade or business and as
most clearly reflecting the income.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.471 (1980).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1980).
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Save Humanity From Itself, Inc. produces solar-powered mono-
rail cars to be used in progressive cities throughout the world. Such
items as tinted plexiglass windows, orthopedically designed seats,
hydraulic platform lifts for handicapped passengers, and educa-
tional television monitors are mass-purchased during the course of
the year for installation in each car. If the company were not re-
quired to inventory, these expenses would be deductible either at
the time of payment or on the date the liability for payment
becomes fixed. 2 Under the inventory method, however, the cost of
component parts of a product is not deductible until the product is
sold. A physical inventory of items such as windows and seats is
taken at the beginning and at the end of the year, and the total
cost of the items inventoried is calculated. 8 To determine the cost
of the cars sold during the year (the "cost of goods sold") the
amount of the beginning inventory is added to the total cost of all
parts purchased during the year and then is reduced by the
amount of ending inventory. This technique allows the sales price
of each car to be offset by the cost of producing the car, the result
being net profit.3 4
The main benefit derived from this accounting process is its the-
oretically desirable matching of income with the expense incurred
to produce that income. Unfortunately, this laudable goal does not
bring joy to the hearts of taxpayers for two reasons: (1) a deferred
deduction is not worth as much as an immediate one; and (2) with-
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)-(2) (1980).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1980) provides that "[tihe inventory should include all
finished or partly finished goods .... " In addition, only those raw materials and supplies
"which have been acquired for sale or which will physically become a part of merchandise
intended for sale" shall be included in inventory. The most difficult element of the invento-
rying procedure is assigning a cost to the inventory. This costing process involved such con-
cepts as LIFO inventories (I.R.C. § 472) and the lower of cost or market, which are outside
the scope of this paper.
34. The inventory regulations under I.R.C. § 471 do not define "inventory," an unfortu-
nate deficiency which has allowed the Service to argue that requiring deduction of feed
expense when feed is consumed is not the same as requiring the taxpayer to inventory.
Section 471 regulations are clearly intended to provide the rules for deducting "product
costs" (costs incurred in producing a product) as the product is sold. This is most apparent
from an example in Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(e) (1980) where the unit-livestock price method of
valuing a farmer's inventory is explained. In that example, a cattle raiser determines that it
costs $15.00 to produce a calf and $7.50 per year to raise it. The example then provides that
the $7.50 per year to raise a calf is allocated to the cost of calves each year (rather than
deducted as consumed). One could infer from this example (and other examples throughout
this regulation) that I.R.C. § 471 "inventorying" means allocating product costs to an ac-
count which accumulates the cost elements of the final product and then deducting these
costs as the product is sold. Thus the regulations, read as a whole, are beneficial to the
Commissioner's argument that requiring deduction when consumed is not "inventorying."
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out an immediate deduction for the cash expenditure, taxpayers
may be short of cash when April rolls around.
C. The Farmer's Historical Preference
Although a farmer is as much in the business of selling a product
as is a manufacturer of monorail cars, Treasury Regulation section
1.471-6(a) gives the farmer the option not to use inventories and to
choose, instead, to use the cash method.38 The justification for this
concession, granted to farmers years ago, has been stated in a num-
ber of different ways, most of which stem from the nature of the
farming business. The explanation most often cited, but hardly en-
lightening, is that given by the Supreme Court in Catto v. United
States: "The sacrifice in accounting accuracy under the cash
method represents an historical concession by the Secretary and
the Commissioner to provide a unitary and expedient bookkeeping
system for farmers and ranchers in need of a more simplified ac-
counting procedure." 6
So why do farmers need a more simplified method of account-
ing? One reason given is that the costs of "producing" one cow or a
bushel of wheat are not as easily ascertainable as the costs of pro-
ducing manufactured goods.37 The cost of a farmer's product de-
pends upon the season, the weather and a whole list of other in-
tangibles.38 These practical difficulties in determining the cost of
goods sold are recognized by other regulations which provide farm-
ers who opt to use the inventory system with special methods for
allocating cost.39
Other possible justifications for the farmers' historical preference
are not as persuasive. One author suggested that the special treat-
35. See note 4 supra.
36. United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 116, 66-1 USTC 9376 (1966).
37. See Davenport, A Bountiful Tax Harvest, 48 TEx. L. REv. 1, 2 (1969); Emory, The
Corman and Mills-Mansfield Bills: A Look at Some Major Tax Reform Issues, 29 TAx L.
REV. 1, 76 (1973); Ward, supra note 1, at 1148-51. Another practical problem faced by farm-
ers is that under an inventory system the amount of an item that has been consumed in
producing unsold products must be determined in order to arrive at a final cost of goods
sold. If a cattle feeder starts the year with ten bushels of corn and ends the year with five
bushels (with no intervening purchases), and if he sold two of his five cows during the year,
theoretically he would determine the cost (in terms of corn) of the cows sold by subtracting
ending inventory (five bushels) and the amount of corn consumed by the three remaining
cows from beginning inventory. It is very burdensome, however, for the farmer to maintain
records of the feed consumed by each cow. See Gaddis v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 741,
758, 71-2 USTC $ 9527 at 87,134-35 (S.D. Miss. 1971).
38. Heinold v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 691 (1979).
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(d), (e) (1980).
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ment may be a disguised tax subsidy due to the average farmer's
low income status.40 Another author noted the average farmer's
relative lack of bookkeeping experience."1
Whatever the reason for the preference, the fact remains that
under Treasury Regulation section 1.471-6(a), most farmers may
not be required to inventory. The taxpayer, therefore, has argued
that the Commissioner will violate that regulation if he forces the
taxpayer-farmer to deduct feed expense at the time feed is con-
sumed, a requirement that will at least entail taking a physical
inventory.
D. Recent Congressional Response
The foundation of this comment will not be complete unless it is
recalled that some types of farmers have been legislatively ex-
cluded from the scope of Treasury Regulation section 1.471-6(a).
Code section 447, passed by Congress as part of the 1976 Tax Re-
form Act, no longer allows farming corporations or farming part-
nerships with a corporate partner the option to use the cash
method.2 Except for certain small corporations, subchapter S cor-
porations, and family corporations, corporate farmers must use the
accrual method "with the capitalization of preproductive period
expenses.' 3 This latter clause, in essence, requires the deduction
of costs related to the production of crops or livestock in the year
when the crops or livestock are sold."
Section 464, also part of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, is aimed at
limited partnerships typically used in the present tax shelter
scheme. This section provides that "farming syndicates," defined
to include most tax shelter vehicles, must deduct amounts paid for
such items as feed, seed and fertilizer when the items are
40. See Davenport, supra note 37, at 44-49.
41. J. O'BYRNE, FARM INCOME TAX MANUAL § 104(a) (5th ed. 1977).
42. I.R.C. § 447(a) provides:
(a) General rule.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the taxable income
from farming of-
(1) a corporation engaged in the trade or business of farming, or
(2) a partnership engaged in the trade or business of farming, if a corpo-
ration is a partner in such partnership,
shall be computed on an accrual method of accounting and with the capitalization
of preproductive period expenses ....
43. Id.
44. I.R.C. § 447(b)(1) states that in general: "For purposes of this section, the term
'preproductive period expenses' means any amount which is attributable to crops, animals,
or any other property having a crop or yield during the preproductive period of such
property."
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consumed."
Although deduction of prepaid farming expenses in the year pur-
chased is no longer available to large farming corporations or
"farming syndicates," there remains a sizeable group of farmers
not covered by the recent legislation. For the individual farmer or
family-owned farming operation, the cash method of accounting
may be preferable both because the taxes due more closely coin-
cide with the cash available and because bookkeeping is simplified.
If for business reasons these cash basis farmers must purchase
more feed or fertilizer than can be used in the tax year, disallowing
a deduction of that expense may result in tax liabilities which the
small farmer cannot realistically meet. Thus, the question of the
proper timing of prepaid farming expenses remains of great con-
cern to those farmers not within the scope of sections 447 and 464.
For any resolution of the issue, the farmer must wade through the
muddy waters of recent cases.
III. RECENT CASE LAW
Recent decisions subsequent to the Service's statement of its po-
sition in Revenue Ruling 75-152 indicate that the situation is not
any clearer; in fact, the waters are murkier than ever. The Court of
Claims has taken the side of the Service, requiring prepaid feed
45. I.R.C. § 464(a) provides:
(a) General rule.-In the case of any farming syndicate (as defined in sub-
section (c)), a deduction (otherwise allowable under this chapter) for amounts
paid for feed, seed, fertilizer, or other similar farm supplies shall only be allowed
for the taxable year in which such feed, seed, fertilizer, or other supplies are actu-
ally used or consumed, or, if later, in the taxable year for which allowable as a
deduction (determined without regard to this section).
(c) Farming syndicate defined.-
(1) In general.-For purposes of this section, the term "farming
syndicate" means-
(A) a partnership or any other enterprise other than a corpo-
ration which is not an electing small business corporation (as
defined in section 1371 (b)) engaged in the trade or business of
farming, if at any time interests in such partnership or enter-
prise have been offered for sale in any offering required to be
registered with any Federal or State agency having authority
to regulate the offering of securities for sale, or
(B) a partnership or any other enterprise other than a cor-
poration which is not an electing small business corporation
(as defined in section 1371 (b)) engaged in the trade or busi-
ness of farming, if more than 35 percent of the losses during
any period are allocable to limited partners or limited
entrepreneurs.
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expenses to be deducted when consumed.4 6 The Tax Court, how-
ever, has consistently held for the taxpayer, basing its decisions
both upon the historical preference given to farmers and upon a
mystical union of the "business purpose" and the "clear reflection
of income" tests.4 7 The Sixth Circuit has also held for the tax-
payer, but its analysis of the problem derives primarily from an
implied limitation of the Service's authority under section 446."0
The most recent prepaid feed expense cases generally deal with
a limited partnership organized at the end of the tax year for the
purpose of operating a cattle feeding business. The partnership im-
mediately purchases large quantities of feed, most of which will be
consumed in the following year; thus, the partnership has no in-
come for its short tax year, but reports the entire amount of feed
purchased as a deduction. The cash basis taxpayer, a limited part-
ner, claims a share of the ordinary loss generated by the feed ex-
pense to offset against personal income.49
A. Owens v. Commissioner
Owens v. Commissioner50 involves only a slight deviation from
the normal fact pattern because the business entity was a corpora-
tion rather than a limited partnership. The taxpayer, as transferee
of the corporation's assets, was potentially liable for any deficiency
due to the corporation's deduction of prepaid feed expenses.5 1
The Tax Court disallowed the deduction, finding that the
purchases of feed were made by a refundable deposit rather than
an actual payment.52 Re-examining the purchase contracts, the
Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court. It held that because
the parties contracted for and adhered to a fixed price, the
purchases were not made on the basis of a refundable deposit.5
46. Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422, 78-2 USTC V 9566 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
47. Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083 (1979); Rocco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 140 (1979); De La Cruz v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24 (1978); Haynes v. Com-
missioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 950 (1979); Heinold v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 685
(1979).
48. Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233, 78-1 USTC 9144 (6th Cir. 1977), af'g and
rev'g 64 T.C. 1 (1975).
49. Although the majority of the cases revolve around a limited partnership, the courts
have made no distinction between partnership or corporate farming operations and individ-
ual farmers for purposes of analysis.
50. 568 F.2d 1233, 78-1 USTC 1 9144 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'g and rev'g 64 T.C. 1 (1975).
51. Id. at 1236, 78-1 USTC at 83,148.
52. 64 T.C. at 19.
53. 568 F.2d at 1244, 78-1 USTC at 83,154.
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The Sixth Circuit, therefore, was forced to reach the Commis-
sioner's second contention that the deduction in the year of
purchase did not clearly reflect income. Under section 446(b), the
Commissioner sought to reallocate a portion of the feed expense to
the year when it was actually consumed.5" The court was not im-
pressed, and the Commissioner's argument was disposed of in a
single paragraph without any mention of the farmer's historical op-
tion to use the cash method of accounting.
The court noted that the Commissioner had the authority under
section 446 to change the accounting treatment of any item of in-
come or deduction in order to clearly reflect income;55 however, ac-
cording to the court, a limitation on this power was implied in the
regulations:
The problem with the Commissioner's argument is that under
Regulation section 1.446(a)(1), the Commissioner is required to
choose some other method of accounting that would more accu-
rately reflect income, and in the present case it is not apparent
that any other method of accounting would lead to a different
result than the cash receipts and disbursements method of han-
dling the feed expense deduction. It would not be different with
the accrual method.5 6
Under the accrual method, liabilities may be deducted in the
taxable year when all events have occurred which establish the lia-
bility, if the dollar amount of the expense is reasonably certain.5 7 A
cash prepayment of a fixed amount under a contract meets the
above stated test; therefore, the cash and accrual methods would
treat prepaid feed expense the same.58 There was no discussion of
the appropriateness of capitalizing the expense (deducting when
consumed) or of requiring the taxpayer to inventory under section
471 (treating the expense as part of the cost of cattle and deduct-
ing it when the cattle are sold).
B. Clement v. United States
Shortly after the Sixth Circuit wrestled with farmers' prepaid
feed expense in Owens, the Court of Claims was faced with the
54. Id. at 1243 n.8, 78-1 USTC at 83,153 n.8.
55. Id. at 1245, 78-1 USTC at 83,155.
56. Id. at 1246, 78-1 USTC at 83,155.
57. Id. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1980).
58. 568 F.2d at 1246, 78-1 USTC at 83,155-56.
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same issue in Clement v. United States. 9 The Clement taxpayer, a
limited partner of a cattle feeding business, was not as fortunate as
the taxpayer in Owens. In a lengthy per curiam opinion, the trial
judge's decision in favor of the taxpayer was reversed, and the tax-
payer was required to deduct the prepaid expenses in the year or
years when the feed was consumed.
The issues in Clement were framed by the conditions for deduc-
tion found in Revenue Ruling 75-152: (1) the prepayment is not
merely a deposit; (2) the expenditure is made for a business pur-
pose rather than a tax avoidance purpose; and (3) deduction of the
expense does not result in a material distortion of income. Since
the Government did not argue that the expenditure was a de-
posit, 60 only the latter two conditions were at issue. Additionally,
the taxpayer argued that even if a material distortion of income
existed, the regulation giving a farmer the option not to inventory
precluded the Commissioner from requiring the taxpayer to deduct
feed expense when consumed. 1 The trial judge's opinion and the
court's opinion differed only as to this last issue. 2
1. Business Purpose versus Tax Avoidance Purpose
Initially, the Clement taxpayer protested the requirement that
he justify the timing of his feed expense because the purchase of
feed was obviously "ordinary and necessary" under section 162 of
the Code. 3 The taxpayer relied on Mann v. Commissioner, " where
the Eighth Circuit searched in vain for cases supporting the Gov-
ernment's argument that the taxpayer must prove some nontax
benefit resulting from the timing of the prepayment.6 5 The Clem-
59. 580 F.2d 422, 78-2 USTC 9566 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
60. Id. at 424 n.1, 78-2 USTC at 84,773 n.1.
61. Id. at 432, 78-2 USTC at 84,779.
62. In fact, the court adopted verbatim the opinion of the trial judge as to the first two
issues (whether a business purpose existed and whether the deduction materially distorted
income). Id. at 424, 78-2 USTC at 84,773.
63. Id. at 427, 78-2 USTC at 84,775. Section 162(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as
a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business .... "
64. 483 F.2d 673, 73-2 USTC 9618 (8th Cir. 1973). The taxpayer also cited Cravens v.
Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895, 60-1 USTC 1 9139 (10th Cir. 1959); Gaddis v. United States,
330 F. Supp. 741, 71-2 USTC 9527 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Ernst v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 181,
185-86 (1959).
65. The Mann court stated that it found "no substantial support . . . to support the
Government's contention that a benefit to the taxpayer is necessary to support the timing of
a business expense deduction which meets the terms of § 162(a) . 483 F.2d at 680, 73-
2 USTC at 82,002.
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ent court noted that several of the cases cited by the taxpayer as
questioning the necessity of the business purpose test nevertheless
went on to discover a business purpose for the timing of the pre-
payment.6" Even the strong language of the Mann court was mere
dicta, because that court had already acknowledged the existence
of a business purpose. Faced with a balanced lack of support for
either position, the court in Clement was reluctant to disregard the
motives of the taxpayer; "Acceptance of the [taxpayer's] proposi-
tion would confront the policy that tax consequences should be
based on business reality and not on mere events created to avoid
taxes."6 8 No such confrontation occurred, however, since the court
went on to find a business motive for buying substantial quantities
of feed in December-an assured supply of feed at a fixed (and
historically lower) price.69
2. Material Distortion of Income
Citing Treasury Regulation section 1.471-6(a), the taxpayer ar-
gued that the Commissioner could not use his powers under sec-
tion 446(b) of the Code against a farmer using the cash method of
accounting.70 This argument, however, was quickly rejected by the
court in light of the Commissioner's broad discretion under section
446(b) and his ability to change the accounting treatment of any
one item in order to clearly reflect income. In addition, the court
cited several cases (none involving farmers) holding that the Com-
missioner was authorized to alter the accounting treatment of an
item on the ground that improper timing of a deduction materially
distorted income.7 2 The court also briefly mentioned Treasury Reg-
ulation section 1.461-1(a)(1), a section that would be invoked later
to the benefit of the Commissioner.
66. 580 F.2d at 427, 78-2 USTC at 84,775. The Court of Claims cited Ernst v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C. 181 (1959), as the only case where the court actually failed to find a business
purpose. Since the principle issue in Ernst was whether a payment or a deposit was made,
the Clement court found Ernst to be distinguishable. 580 F.2d at 427, 78-2 USTC at 84,775.
67. 580 F.2d at 427, 78-2 USTC at 84,775.
68. Id., 78-2 USTC at 84,775-76.
69. Id. at 427-28, 78-2 USTC at 84,776.
70. Id. at 430, 78-2 USTC at 84,778. See note 15 supra.
71. 580 F.2d at 430, 78-2 USTC at 84,778.
72. Id. at 430-32, 78-2 USTC at 84,777-79. The court cited Burck v. Commissioner, 533
F.2d 768, 76-1 USTC V 9283 (2d Cir. 1976) (prepaid interest); Commissioner v. Boylston
Mkt. Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966, 42-2 USTC 9820 (1st Cir. 1942) (prepaid insurance premiums);
Sandor v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), aff'd, 536 F.2d 874, 76-2 USTC $ 9488 (9th Cir.
1976) (prepaid interest); Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1179 (1930) (prepaid loan
fees).
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Satisfied that section 446(b) was applicable to the situation, the
court had little difficulty finding a material distortion of income.
Though the factors cited in Revenue Ruling 75-152 were to be used
"as a guide, '3 the court ignored all but the monetary differences
between income as computed by the taxpayer and as computed by
deducting the expense in a subsequent year. Because the choice of
year for deduction would result in very different income figures,
deduction in the year of payment was found to cause a material
distortion.4
3. Historical Preference
Having agreed on the presence of a business purpose and a ma-
terial distortion of income, the trial judge and the court parted
company. The trial judge found that even though income was not
clearly reflected, the Commissioner could not force a cash basis
farmer to deduct feed expense when the feed is consumed, rather
than when payment is made. Such a requirement, the trial judge
reasoned, would "indirectly" force the taxpayer to use an inventory
method, a result prohibited by Treasury Regulation section 1.471-
6(a) (which gives farmers the option not to use an inventory
method of accounting).75
The court interpreted Treasury Regulation section 1.471-6(a)
much differently. For a number of reasons, the court concluded
that the Commissioner's required deduction of feed when con-
sumed was a perfectly appropriate adjustment under the cash
method; it therefore did not impose an inventory method of ac-
counting. The court's position was supported primarily by Treas-
ury Regulation section 1.461-1(a)(1), which is part of the Treas-
73. 580 F.2d at 431, 78-2 USTC at 84,779. Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144, lists factors
to be considered in determining whether a material distortion of income exists: "[Tihe cus-
tomary business practice of the taxpayer in conducting his livestock operations, the amount
of the expenditure in relation to past purchases, the time of the year the expenditure was
made, and the materiality of the expenditure in relation to the taxpayer's income for the
year." 75-1 C.B. at 145.
74. 580 F.2d at 431, 78-2 USTC at 84,779. As in Clement, a finding of "material distor-
tion of income" often turns upon a comparison of dollar amounts of taxable income under
both the accrual method and cash method accounting. See, e.g., Sandor v. Commissioner,
536 F.2d 874, 76-2 USTC 1 9488 (9th Cir. 1976); Baird v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 115 (1977);
Cole v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1091 (1975). The disparity in amount may be a sure indica-
tion of materiality, but the courts often fail to explain why the method chosen by the tax-
payer, rather than by the Commissioner, "distorts" income. See Judge Hall's criticism of the
practice of comparing results under accrual and cash methods. Cole, 64 T.C. at 1107 (Hall,
J., concurring).
75. 580 F.2d at 432, 78-2 USTC at 84,779.
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ury's discussion of when expenses may be deducted under the cash
method. This regulation provides either for partial deduction or no
deduction of an expenditure in the year made if the payment "re-
sults in the creation of an asset having a useful life which extends
substantially beyond the close of the taxable year. . . .'" Accord-
ing to the court, feed was a "separate and distinct asset" with a
useful life exceeding the taxable year."
The court stated that application of section 1.461-1(a)(1) to pre-
paid feed expenses of a cash basis farmer did not operate to force
the taxpayer to use the inventory system; rather "what the Service
did was to treat plaintiffs like other cash-method taxpayers. '7 8
This result was supported by a rather loosely woven discussion of
"period costs" and "product costs," terms generally used to deline-
ate the proper accounting procedure for expenses under the inven-
tory method. The court explained that "'[p]roduct costs' are in-
curred in producing a product and are accounted for, under the
inventory method, only on the sale of the products to which they
relate . . . .,, Period costs, however, "arise with respect to time
intervals rather than with particular products or services . . .-.
The inventory system of accounting, which requires certain
items to be inventoried at year's end and deducted when the re-
lated product is sold, applies only to product costs."' Since the
Commissioner was not requiring the taxpayer to deduct feed ex-
pense when the cattle were sold, the court reasoned that section
1.471-6(a) was not violated. 2 Feed, normally a product cost, was
being treated instead as a period cost, deductible when the feed
was consumed.s The court stated that "[flor all cash-method tax-
payers, comparable 'period costs' (where there would otherwise be
income distortion) would be spread over a time span .
Finding no evidence that cash basis farmers were to be treated any
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1980). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1980) where
the same language is also applied to accrual method taxpayers.
77. 580 F.2d at 432 n.9, 78-2 USTC at 84,780 n.9.
78. Id. at 433, 78-2 USTC at 84,780. Cf. Gold-Pak Meat Co. v. Commissioner, 522 F.2d
1055, 1057, 75-2 USTC 1 9693 at 88,106 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6 gives a
farmer a favor which comports with the general beneficence given farmers by Congress and
it is not lightly to be taken away by another regulation. Maybe it should be taken away, but
that is not our function.").
79. 580 F.2d at 432 n.7, 78-2 USTC at 84,780 n.7.
80. Id. at n.8, 78-2 USTC at 84,780 n.8.
81. Id. at 432, 78-2 USTC at 84,780.
82. Id. at 432 n.7, 78-2 USTC at 84,780 n.7.
83. Id. at 433, 78-2 USTC at 84,780.
84. Id.
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differently than other cash method taxpayers, and assuming that
an inventory system was not being imposed, the court required
that the taxpayer's feed expense be spread over the period
consumed. 5
C. Van Raden v. Commissioner
The facts of Van Raden v. Commissionerea are substantially sim-
ilar to those in Clement with one additional aspect-the Van Ra-
den taxpayer purchased his interests in the limited partnership
shortly after receiving an extraordinary capital gain of $2 million
in the same tax year. As will be seen, this indication of tax motiva-
tion had little influence on the Tax Court.
Reviewed by the full court, the Van Raden case is indicative of
the confusion in the area of prepaid feed expense. The majority
opinion by Judge Goffe drew a concurring opinion by Judge Tan-
nenwald (joined by four other judges), a dissent by Judge Wilbur
(joined by two other judges) and a dissent by Judge Chabot.
Rather than explaining each opinion separately, this comment will
analyze the case issue by issue, with a discussion of how the judges
differed.
1. Business Purpose
Unlike the taxpayer in Clement, the Van Raden taxpayer did
not challenge the applicability of the business purpose test to the
timing of the deduction.8 7 Instead, the taxpayer relied upon testi-
mony of the manager of the limited partnership and upon statistics
of corn prices over the previous seven years to prove that corn
prices are generally lower near the end of the year. The court
found that the evidence was sufficient to establish a business pur-
pose, particularly since the Service did not offer any evidence to
rebut either the manager's testimony or the statistics.88
The court was not concerned that the taxpayer's need to offset a
massive capital gain may have motivated the transaction.' The
85. Id.
86. 71 T.C. 1083, 1084 (1979).
87. Id. at 1097. In his concurring opinion, Judge Tannenwald felt "constrained to men-
tion" that the appropriateness of the business purpose test was suspect, but did not pursue
the issue further. Id. at 1112.
88. Id. at 1099.
89. Id. at 1100. The Van Raden majority cited Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 561, 580, 78-1 USTC q 9370 at 83,883 (1978), where the Supreme Court stated that
"[the fact that favorable tax consequences were taken into account by Lyon [the taxpayer]
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concurring opinion placed slightly more emphasis on tax avoidance
motives, but found enough economic reality to legitimize the
transaction. 0
Judge Wilbur, in his dissent, stated that the majority's finding of
business purpose was "surprising." 91 He believed that the taxpayer
was acting against his business interests by purchasing feed every
December, rather than earlier in the fall harvest when prices were
even lower." According to Judge Wilbur, the tax motivation for
the timing of the purchase should preclude immediate deduction
of the expense."
2. Material Distortion of Income
The Van Raden taxpayer contested the use of section 446(b) on
a cash-method farmer with an argument similar to that raised by
the taxpayer in Clement. The Van Raden taxpayer argued that
section 446(b) conflicted with the option given farmers to use the
cash method and section 461, which provides generally for deduc-
tion of expenses in the taxable year which would be proper under
the taxpayer's chosen method of accounting. " The majority fol-
lowed Clement on this point, stating that "nothing in the case law
cited by petitioners convinces us that section 446(b) cannot be
used by the Commissioner to prevent abuses by farmers who re-
port on the cash method of accounting." 9
After deciding that section 446(b) should be applied at the part-
nership level, 96 the court was next faced with the question
"whether the Commissioner abused his discretion in his determi-
nation that the partnership must use an inventory method of ac-
counting for the feed in order to clearly reflect income. '97 Unlike
the Clement court, the majority in Van Raden went beyond the
on entering into the transaction is no reason for disallowing those consequences."
90. 71 T.C. at 1111-12.
91. Id. at 1115.
92. Id. at 1116.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1102.
95. Id. at 1103. The concurring opinion of Judge Tannenwald was more favorable to the
taxpayer on this point. Judge Tannenwald felt that the Treasury's concession to farmers
under Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(a) amounted to the Commissioner's "agreement that the 'clearly
reflect income' requirement of section 446(b) is deemed to have been satisfied." Id. at 1111.
96. Id. at 1104.
97. Id. It might be noted that the court framed the issue assuming, without discussion,
that the Commissioner's requirement of deducting feed expense when consumed forced the
taxpayer onto the inventory method. Later in the opinion the court explained its position
more fully.
1980]
252 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:233
dollar amounts involved in determining whether income was actu-
ally distorted. The court first pointed out that the cash method of
accounting, by its nature, will not result in income perfectly
matched with expenses; the benefits derived from the expenses will
often spill over into more than one accounting period.98 Consistent
application of the cash method over a period of years, however,
would tend to eliminate the inherent distortions."
Perceiving that the taxpayer's treatment of prepaid expenses
was consistent over years of business activity and was in accord
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAPs),100 the
court reasoned that the method would be regarded as clearly re-
flecting income unless the GAAPs conflicted with the regula-
tions. 101 The court noted that the Commissioner's own regulations
gave farmers the option to use the cash method without inventory-
ing. The court further stated, with some sarcasm, that the Com-
missioner "does not contend that his own regulations prescribed an
optional accounting system that does not clearly reflect income."101 '
At this point, the court embarked upon a line of reasoning which
brought criticism from both dissenting opinions. Because the ac-
counting method of a particular business is often dictated by trade
conditions or practices, the court felt that distortion of income
could not be properly determined without examining the business
considerations surrounding the challenged transaction. 0 3 In other
98. Id.
99. Id. See also Gold-Pak Meat Co. v. Commissioner, 522 F.2d 1055, 1057, 75-2 USTC V
9693 at 88,106 (9th Cir. 1975); Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195, 197, 70-2 USTC
9545 at 84,323 (9th Cir. 1970).
100. "'Generally accepted accounting principles' are a body of rules used to 'indicate
whether [a] company being audited has prepared its financial statements in an acceptable
manner, so that they may fairly be compared with the prior year's statements and with the
financial statements of other companies.'" W. MEIGS, A. MOSICH, C. JOHNSON & C. KELLER,
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 12 (3d ed. 1974). These accounting principles, although not con-
tained in one specific source, represent the theoretically proper accounting techniques to be
used in analyzing and compiling financial data. Id. See also, Note, Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles: Instruction H(f) and the Preferability Issue, 11 VAL. U.L. REv. 229,
230 (1977).
101. 71 T.C. at 1105. The court was dangerously close to granting a presumption in favor
of the taxpayer if GAAP were met. The recent Supreme Court decision of Thor Power Tool
Co. v. Commissioner, 99 S.Ct. 773, 785, 79-1 USTC V 9139 at 86,134 (1979), cited in Van
Raden, 71 T.C. at 1105, strongly denied such a presumption, stating that conformance with
GAAPS and clear reflection of income were separate tests, with clear reflection of income
having greater weight.
102. 71 T.C. at 1105.
103. Id. Some examples given by the court of accounting methods suited to a particular
business included inventorying for a product manufacturing or sales business, Treas. Reg. §
1.446-1(a)(4)(i) (1980); a crop method of accounting for farmers, Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
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words, a distortion which results from the method of operation of
the business rather than from the method of accounting alone is
not the type of distortion which may be attacked by the Commis-
sioner. As an example, the court considered the case of a retail
business which had income much greater in December than in Jan-
uary because of the relative success of the sales force. The court
analogized this business-created distortion of income to the distor-
tion involved when prepaid feed expenses are deducted in the year
of payment: "Should the result be different if the taxpayer
purchases a year's supply of its primary cost item at its lowest cost
consistently from year to year? We do not think so. ''104 The gen-
eral rule emerging from the court's analysis, previously recognized
only implicitly (and even this was debated 0 5), is that "a substan-
tial legitimate business purpose satisfies [i.e., does not offend] the
distortion of income test." 10 16 Having already found that a business
purpose existed for the prepayment, the court concluded that the
taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflected income.
The dissenting opinions, particularly that of Judge Chabot, op-
posed the union of the business purpose test with the question of
whether an accounting method clearly reflects income.107 According
to Judge Chabot, the majority effectively nullified section 446(b)
with respect to prepaid feed expense. s08 He relied on Baird v. Com-
missioner'09 for the proposition that the existence of a business
purpose is merely a factor in determining whether there is a distor-
tion of income.
3. Historical Preference
The majority in Van Raden refused to follow the Clement
l(c)(10)(iii) (1980); and not requiring formal books for a wage earner, Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1(b)(2) (1980).
104. 71 T.C. at 1106.
105. See id. at 1117 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1106. The majority cited Sandor v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), affd,
536 F.2d 874, 76-2 USTC 9488 (9th Cir. 1976) as implicitly recognizing this general rule.
Other cases cited by the court for this proposition were Maple Leaf Farms, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 64 T.C. 438 (1975); Hi-Plains Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 158 (1973),
afl'd, 496 F.2d 520, 74-1 USTC V 9431 (10th Cir. 1974); Stokes v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 415
(1954).
107. 71 T.C. at 1117 (Chabot, J., dissenting). Judge Wilbur called the majority's position
"dubious" but did not discuss the issue at length. Since he felt that no business purpose
existed, in his opinion the taxpayer should have lost even under the majority's test. 71 T.C.
at 1115-16 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
108. 71 T.C. at 1117.
109. 68 T.C. 115, 133 (1977).
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court's analysis of the farmers' historical option to elect not to in-
ventory.110 The Clement court, as well as Judge Wilbur's dissent-
ing opinion,' concluded that the feed expense was being treated
as a period cost, for purposes of Treasury Regulation section 1.461-
1(a)(1). The Van Raden majority, however, could not so easily re-
classify feed as a period cost.
The court believed that one of the major differences between pe-
riod and product costs was that period costs may be allocated with
convenience, usually by simple division of the cost by the number
of months over which its useful life extends."' Because product
costs, such as feed, are related to the production process, variations
in production will increase or decrease the rate of allocation." 8 To
properly determine when cattle feed is consumed would require
the farmer to maintain an inventory of feed from year to year or to
keep records of consumption which is, in essence, a continual in-
ventory."1 The court concluded that requiring either system would
conflict with the regulation allowing farmers to choose to forgo
inventorying. 5
In his concurrence, Judge Tannenwald enthusiastically agreed
with the majority's analysis of this issue. In fact, Judge Tannen-
wald would have decided for the taxpayer solely upon the basis of
the farmers' historical preference, without considering the other is-
sues. Supported by Gertrude Stein's definition of a rose,"" he ad-
monished the Court of Claims for engaging in "sheer semantic leg-
erdemain" when they characterized feed expenditures as period
costs rather than an element of cost of goods sold.117 Although he
recognized that deducting feed expense when consumed is different
from inventorying it as part of the cost of cattle, he insisted that
the Service's position would still require farmers to maintain an
inventory of their feed, a requirement in direct conflict with the
farmer's right to use the cash method under Treasury Regulation
section 1.471-6(a)." 8
110. 71 T.C. at 1107.
111. Id. at 1114.
112. Id. at 1108.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. "'A rose is a rose, is a rose, is a rose.'" Id. at 1111 (quoting G. STEIN, GEOGRAPHY
AND PLAYS: SACRED EMILY 187 (1922)). To complete the analogy: a product cost is a product
cost, is a product cost; calling it a "period cost" will not make it so.
117. 71 T.C. at 1111.
118. Id.
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IV. OTHER RECENT DECISIONS AND RULINGS
A. Tax Court
In two recent Tax Court memo decisions, Haynes v. Commis-
sioner11 and Heinold v. Commissioner,1 20 the Tax Court substan-
tially adhered to the position it adopted in Van Raden. The Ser-
vice, however, altered its emphasis to conform more closely to the
Clement opinion. The primary argument of the Service in both
cases was that feed is a capital asset subject to the rules for capi-
talizing expenditures under Treasury Regulation section 1.461-
1(a)(1). 2 ' This argument was used in conjunction with the Ser-
vice's old standby: immediate deduction of the full amount did not
clearly reflect income; therefore, the Commissioner had the author-
ity under section 446(b) to require deduction as the feed was con-
sumed. 12 In addition, the Service argued in Heinold that ,he tax-
payer had no business purpose for the prepayment. The Service
conceded business purpose in Haynes.12 3
In deciding for the taxpayer, both the Haynes and Heinold
courts made a very important subtraction from and addition to the
Van Raden opinion."2 4 The subtraction, quite obvious and very
puzzling, is found in their consideration of the distortion of income
test. In Van Raden the court had stated unequivocally that "a sub-
stantial legitimate business purpose satisfies [i.e., does not offend]
the distortion of income test."'1 2' Yet in Haynes and Heinold the
courts, having recognized a valid business purpose, resolved the
distortion issue by relying upon the cash method's tendency to cor-
rect distortions over a period of time. 12 Neither court mentioned
business purpose in conjunction with the distortion of income test.
The addition to Van Raden may have resulted from its analysis
of whether income was clearly reflected; however, the substance of
this new rationale is not apparent in previous cases. Although rec-
119. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 950 (1979).
120. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 685 (1979).
121. Haynes, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 953; Heinold, 39 T.C.M. at 690. The Service also men-
tioned "the principles of I.R.C. § 263," even though that section has no relation to prepaid
feed expense. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 953-54.
122. Haynes, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 952; Heinold, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 688.
123. In neither case did the taxpayer challenge application of the business purpose test
to the timing of feed deductions.
124. The importance of these modifications is amplified by the fact that the judges who
wrote these opinions, Judge Featherston and Judge Wiles, were members of the Van Raden
majority.
125. 71 T.C. at 1106.
126. Haynes, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 953; Heinold, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691.
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ognizing that income was 'distorted, the Haynes and Heinold
courts rejected the Commissioner's attempt to use section 446(b)
as a springboard into section 1.461-1(a)(1) of the regulations, rea-
soning that:
The distortion in the partnership's 1973 income is not attributa-
ble to the failure to feed all the purchased grain in that year. It is
due to the partnership's failure to sell cattle so that income would
be available to match the cost of the purchases. The same distor-
tion would have occurred if the partnership had fed all the grain
in 1973 and sold none of its cattle. Distortions of this character
can be prevented only by requiring farmers to employ a method
of accounting which requires a matching of income with expenses.
Yet the regulations . . . expressly permit farmers to use the cash
method of accounting. 127
In essence, the courts are pointing out that the Commissioner's
discretion under section 446(b) is limited to changing a taxpayer's
method of accounting to a method which "does clearly reflect in-
come." 128 Since feed expense is a "product cost" (a part of cost of
goods sold), the only way to "clearly reflect" the taxpayer's income
is to require feed expense to be deducted when the cattle are sold;
allowing deduction when the feed is consumed does not promote a
clear reflection of income. 129 Yet, the Commissioner cannot require
a farmer to treat prepaid feed as an element of cost of goods sold
because of section 1.471-6(a).
Despite the logic of the foregoing analysis, both courts felt com-
pelled to provide more support for their position. Each court dis-
tinguished cattle feed from the type of asset dealt with in section
1.461-1(a)(1); however, the Heinold court's analysis was more per-
suasive.130 As in Van Raden, the Heinold court stated that section
1.461-1(a)(1) applies only to "period costs," expenditures which
127. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 954.
128. I.R.C. § 446(b) does indicate that "the opinion of the Secretary" is important in
determining the proper accounting method.
129. Requiring deduction when feed is consumed rather than when it is paid for may
help promote a clearer reflection of income; however, the Commissioner, under I.R.C. §
446(b), does not have discretion to require a change in accounting methods unless the new
method "does clearly reflect income."
130. The Haynes court tackled the regulation with the argument that: "The term 'useful
life' refers to an asset which is gradually exhausted through use or the passage of time.
Cattle feed does not deteriorate with the passage of time or become exhausted through use
over an extended period." 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 954-55. Although this may be a valid distinc-
tion, it is difficult to see why cattle feed is not "exhausted through use over an extended
period of time."
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"arise with respect to time intervals." ' Feed costs, which "depend
upon the size of the production process," would not be reclassified
as "period costs" for the convenience of the Commissioner.'18
The Heinold court also rejected the Commissioner's section 461
argument because farmers would be forced to take inventories or
maintain consumption records, a requirement that directly con-
flicts with the historical preference given to farmers in Catto.1 83
B. District Court
Without the benefit of the Van Raden decision, in Dunn v.
United States,"' the Southern District of New York relied pri-
marily on Revenue Ruling 75-152 to resolve a prepaid cattle feed
expense case in favor of the government. A major portion of the
opinion was spent in deciding whether the ruling should be applied
to the taxpayer retroactively. Finding for the Commissioner on
that issue,"' the court briefly considered the remaining issue of
whether the prepayment resulted in a material distortion of in-
come. The facts of Dunn were particularly egregious-a hurried,
yearend purchase of feed with little or no evidence of business pur-
pose. The court had little difficulty in finding a material distor-
tion.136 Mentioning section 1.471-6(a) in a footnote,""7 the court did
not discuss the possibility of conflict between the regulation and
the Commissioner's requirement that the taxpayer deduct feed ex-
pense when the feed was consumed.
C. Revenue Ruling 79-229
The Service responded to the Van Raden decision by issuing
Revenue Ruling 79-229,1' 8 essentially a restatement of Revenue
Ruling 75-152 buttressed by additional arguments and citations of
authority. The three-part test established in Revenue Ruling 75-
152 was left untouched, but support for both the business purpose
and material distortion of income tests was fortified.
131. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 468 F. Supp. 991, 79-1 USTC 9295 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
135. Id. at 995, 79-1 USTC at 86,670.
136. Id. at 996, 79-1 USTC at 86,670.
137. Id. at 994 n.14, 79-1 USTC at 86,668-69 n.14.
138. 1979-31 I.R.B. 6.
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1. Business Purpose
The principle addition to the Service's position under the busi-
ness purpose test was a warning to those "farmers" who did not
have "a significant capital investment in agricultural assets in ad-
dition to the feed and animals involved." 39 According to the Ser-
vice, these investor-farmers are usually participants in a tax shelter
scheme where the investors contribute an amount sufficient to
purchase the feed, which is then used as collateral for the purchase
of cattle. In the future, such transactions will be more carefully
scrutinized by the Service to discover the true motives of the
investor.140
2. Distortion of Income
Under the distortion of income test the Service's opposition to
Van Raden could be seen more clearly. In effect, summarily dis-
missing the theory that a substantial, legitimate business purpose
satisfies the clear reflection of income standard under section
446(b),"" the Service announced that "[t]he business practice of
prepayment does not necessarily refute the existence of. . .a ma-
terial distortion.' ' 42 Although the Service still listed "customary,
legitimate business practice" as a factor in determining distortion
of income, its position on the list of factors was moved from first to
fourth place. 143
The Service also refused to accept the assertion that a prepay-
ment, deductible under the cash method, was not a distortion of
income because of the cancelling-out process over a period of years.
The Service stated, "The legitimate use of the cash or accrual
methods of accounting does not encompass certain tax shelter
techniques . . . ."'" In other words, the Service will continue to
apply section 446(b) to cash basis farmers, despite the authority
given farmers to use the cash method without inventorying. 4
139. Id. at 7. Basically, the Service is aiming at farming syndicates not covered by I.R.C.
§ 464. See note 45 supra.
140. 1979-31 I.R.B. at 7.
141. See Van Raden, 71 T.C. at 1106.
142. 1979-31 I.R.B. at 7. Despite this obvious attack on Van Raden, the Service did not
specifically mention Van Raden in the ruling.
143. Id. at 8. In light of the Haynes and Heinold courts' lack of concern with the Van
Raden court's combination of the two tests, the Service's position weakens Van Raden even
more.
144. Id; at 7.
145. The Service minimized but did not totally ignore the effect of the year to year pro-
cess of "balancing out" under the cash method in that consistent deduction of prepaid feed
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The Service's reliance on Treasury Regulation section 1.461-
1(a)(1), prohibiting deductions which cause a material distortion of
income, was made more prominent with the citation of Clement
and several prepaid interest cases that applied section 446(b) to
timing discrepancies under section 461.146 Coincidentally, the list
of factors to be considered in determining material distortion of
income was enlarged to include "the useful life of resulting assets
during and beyond the taxable year paid."1' 7
V. ANALYSIS
As the reader may have noticed from the previous discussion of
cases, the courts deciding cases in this area are not adverse to the
"shotgun" method of analysis, usually with the result that it is dif-
ficult to tell where one theory ends and the next begins. For this
reason, it might be helpful to briefly analyze the arguments and
counter-arguments.
A. Whether the Business Purpose Test Applies to Timing of
the Prepayment.
As stated in Revenue Rulings 75-152 and 79-229, the Service
contends that a prepayment must have been made for a valid busi-
ness purpose rather than for a tax avoidance purpose. The exact
origin of this test is unclear, however, since the rulings cite neither
Code sections nor case law to Support its application. The most
logical justification for the test arises from the numerous cases
which have held against a taxpayer based upon a finding that the
transaction was motivated solely by a tax avoidance purpose." 8
The courts in these cases, placing substance over form, tradition-
ally have refused to recognize such schemes. In Clement, the court
recognized this policy and proceeded to apply the business purpose
test to the timing of the prepayment."
costs was recognized as one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a mate-
rial distortion of income exists. Id. at 8.
146. Id. In addition to Clement, the Service cited Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768,
76-1 USTC 9283 (2d Cir. 1976); Cole v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1091 (1975); Sandor v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), af'd per curiam, 536 F.2d 874, 76-2 USTC 9488 (9th
Cir. 1976).
147. 1979-31 I.R.B. at 7.
148. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 45-1 USTC 9215
(1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 35-1 USTC 1 9043 (1935); Goldstein v. Commis-
sioner, 364 F.2d 734, 66-2 USTC 1 9561 (2d Cir. 1966); Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d
180, 64-1 USTC 9103 (4th Cir. 1963).
149. 580 F.2d at 427, 78-2 USTC at 84,775-76.
1980]
260 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:233
The "substance over form" cases, however, are not strictly analo-
gous to the prepaid feed cases. In Goldstein v. Commissioner,150
for instance, the taxpayer arranged a loan and prepaid the interest
solely to lower her tax liability in a year of unusually high income;
the underlying transaction had no business or profit motive. Where
a farmer purchases a year's supply of feed in advance, however, the
feed itself is obviously a necessary item for the operation of the
business. The timing of the purchase may have been tax moti-
vated, but the entire transaction has a legitimate business motive
which should be sufficient to meet the deductibility tests of section
162 (an ordinary and necessary business expense). 151 Nowhere does
section 162 require that a taxpayer justify the timing of an expense
which is necessary to the operation of the taxpayer's business. It
does not necessarily follow that an entire transaction is solely tax
motivated merely because one element of a legitimate business
transaction is tax motivated.
Another closely related reason for discounting the Goldstein line
of cases when considering this issue involves the policy, as strong
as the "business motive" policy cited in Clement, that a taxpayer
is allowed to minimize his taxes by any legitimate means. 152 This
policy is well illustrated by a recent Supreme Court case reviewing
the provisions of a business motivated sale-leaseback arranged so
that the taxpayer-lessee could reap tremendous tax savings.153 The
Supreme Court did not find the taxpayer's consideration of the tax
benefits to be detrimental to the transaction: "We cannot ignore
the reality that the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every busi-
ness transaction.1 54
Despite the apparent lack of authority for requiring a taxpayer
to prove business reasons for his prepayment, the courts continue
to apply the test, sometimes without any challenge from the tax-
payer.15 5 This failure to challenge is probably due to the fact that
the business purpose test is relatively easy to satisfy. Grain costs
are generally lower in the fall harvest and prepayment usually as-
sures a supply of feed while also fixing the maximum price. These
reasons should be sufficient to prove the necessary business
benefit.
150. 364 F.2d 734, 66-2 USTC 1 9561 (2d Cir. 1966).
151. See I.R.C. § 162(a), quoted at note 63 supra.
152. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 35-1 USTC 9043 (1935).
153. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 78-1 USTC 9370 (1978).
154. Id. at 580, 78-1 USTC at 83,883.
155. See Van Raden, 71 T.C. at 1083.
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B. Whether the Commissioner Has the Authority To Require
Deduction of Feed Expense as Feed Is Consumed.
The argument pressed most fervently by the Service in recent
cases is that the deduction of feed expense in the year paid does
not clearly reflect income; therefore, section 446(b) authorizes the
Commissioner to change the taxpayer's method of accounting for
that item of expense. The Commissioner then relies upon Treasury
Regulation section 1.461-1(a)(1) to require deduction of the ex-
pense as feed is consumed. Unfortunately for the Service, there are
many flaws in this argument, each of which has been recognized by
at least one court.
Perhaps the most persuasive counter-argument, and certainly
the most recently recognized, is that section 446(b) does not give
the Service the power to alter an accounting method in order to
more clearly reflect income; rather, the Commissioner must require
a method which "does clearly reflect income." 156 Since prepaid feed
expense is universally recognized as a "product cost," 157 the only
accounting method which will clearly reflect income and allow de-
duction of that expense is an inventory method which requires de-
duction when the cattle are sold. The Commissioner's method of
deferring the deduction until after consumption of the feed may
reflect income more clearly than the immediate deduction method.
Imposition of such a change, however, is not within the Commis-
sioner's section 446(b) discretion.
The Commissioner would undoubtedly meet this argument with
the assertion that requiring deduction when feed is consumed pur-
suant to section 461 is merely the proper application of the cash
method. Admittedly Treasury Regulation section 1.461-1(a)(1),
which provides that certain expenses are to be deducted over the
life of the asset purchased, deals with the proper application of the
cash method. Cattle feed, however, is not the type of asset contem-
plated by this requirement. The most obvious example of an asset
covered by this section is depreciable property or improvements.'
In addition, such expenses as prepaid interest or rent may be cov-
ered by this section because these assets, like depreciable property,
decrease in value through the passage of time, independent of the
156. I.R.C. § 446(b) (emphasis added). In Owens, 568 F.2d at 1246, the court may have
recognized this argument, although its language was somewhat vague. The courts in Hei-
nold, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691, and Haynes, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 954, specifically relied on
this point in holding for the taxpayer.
157. See Van Raden, 71 T.C. at 1107-08.
158. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1970).
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production process. On the other hand, the value of cattle feed de-
creases in direct proportion to the production process (as con-
sumed by the cattle), not through the mere passage of time.
Another reason why section 461 should not apply to cattle feed
is that cattle feed is a "product cost" and even cash basis taxpay-
ers, with the exception of farmers, must treat product costs as an
element of cost of goods sold. If section 461 were to apply to prod-
uct costs, then manufacturers who elected the cash method of ac-
counting could deduct certain product costs as the assets were
used. For example, the monorail car manufacturer discussed earlier
in this comment could elect the cash method, and, relying on
Treasury Regulation section 1.461, deduct the cost of seats, win-
dows, and other component parts as they were used in the produc-
tion process. This would conflict with the requirement in section
471 that manufacturers use an "inventory" method, and such a
conflict should not be mystically created by the Service without
clear proof of authority for such an interpretation of section 461.111
A persuasive argument against the Service's position that imme-
diate deduction materially distorts income, recognized in numerous
cases, is that the very nature of the cash method, a method ap-
proved in section 446(c), will naturally produce a mismatching of
income and expense in certain years.160 Such a result, however, is
not a material distortion because consistent application of the cash
method will cause the mismatching to correct itself. It is difficult
to understand how an accounting method specifically allowed by
the Code, and properly applied, could create a material distortion
of income in violation of section 446(a). Even the regulations rec-
ognize the propriety of the cash method: "[A] method of account-
ing which reflects the consistent application of generally accepted
accounting principles in a particular trade or business . ., will or-
dinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting income . ,,1." In addi-
tion, the regulations tolerate the cash method's mismatching when
they state that the foregoing rule is subject to the requirement that
"all items of gross income and expense [must be] treated consist-
ently from year to year" (presumably so that the mismatching will
be corrected.)'62
Although the preceding arguments would be sufficient to over-
159. See note 34 supra.
160. See, e.g., Van Raden, 71 T.C. at 1104; Haynes, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 955, De La
Cruz v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 27-28 (1978).
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (1980).
162. Id.
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come the Service's opposition, there are additional arguments
favorable to the taxpayer. Perhaps the strongest policy argument
against the Commissioner's position is that historically, farmers
have been allowed to use the most simplified accounting proce-
dures available. Although the origin of the preference is not clear,
the numerous justifications for it indicate that this concession is
very important to farmers. The Commissioner has acknowledged
that under section 471 farmers are given an option not to inven-
tory, but then tries to distinguish away this option by arguing that
requiring deduction when feed is consumed is not tantamount to
requiring an inventory method.1" Although a literal interpretation
of the regulations may support the Commissioner's argument,'"
such tunnel vision does not allow a proper view of the damage be-
ing done to farmers by such an intepretation. The basic rationale
behind the farmers' historical preference to choose the cash
method is their need for simplified accounting methods. This need
is apparent, for example, in the case of a farmer who purchases one
hundred bushels of corn at ten dollars per bushel on December 31.
Then, in order to maintain a large supply of corn (to protect
against shortage or rising prices), he purchases ten bushels at the
first of each succeeding month. If this farmer were required to de-
duct feed expense as the feed is consumed, not only would he have
to take physical inventories, he would also have to use a more com-
plex accounting method to value that inventory. Such require-
ments severely undermine the rationale of providing a more sim-
plified accounting method to farmers.
Congress, too, has recognized the need for most farmers to have
a simplified accounting system. Although it had a perfect opportu-
nity to require all farmers to deduct feed expense when the feed is
consumed, Congress limited sections 447 and 464 to farming corpo-
rations and syndicates-operations that better possess the ability
to deal with complex accounting systems.' 65 This congressional re-
straint implies legislative approval of the immediate deduction of
prepaid feed expense by farmers not covered by sections 447 and
464. Although the Service's arguments do have some basis in logic,
the Code, the regulations, policy considerations and Congress all
compel rejection of the Service's position.
163. See the Commissioner's argument in Clement, 580 F.2d at 432, 78-2 USTC at
84,779.
164. See note 34 supra.
165. See notes 43, 45 & 46 supra.
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